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Abstract— In recent years, defending adversarial perturbations
to natural examples in order to build robust machine learning
models trained by deep neural networks (DNNs) has become
an emerging research field in the conjunction of deep learning
and security. In particular, MagNet consisting of an adversary
detector and a data reformer is by far one of the strongest
defenses in the black-box oblivious attack setting, where the
attacker aims to craft transferable adversarial examples from
an undefended DNN model to bypass an unknown defense
module deployed on the same DNN model. Under this setting,
MagNet can successfully defend a variety of attacks in DNNs,
including the high-confidence adversarial examples generated by
the Carlini and Wagner’s attack based on the L2 distortion
metric. However, in this paper, under the same attack setting
we show that adversarial examples crafted based on the L1
distortion metric can easily bypass MagNet and mislead the
target DNN image classifiers on MNIST and CIFAR-10. We
also provide explanations on why the considered approach can
yield adversarial examples with superior attack performance and
conduct extensive experiments on variants of MagNet to verify its
lack of robustness to L1 distortion based attacks. Notably, our
results substantially weaken the assumption of effective threat
models on MagNet that require knowing the deployed defense
technique when attacking DNNs (i.e., the gray-box attack setting).
I. INTRODUCTION
DNNs are extensively used in many machine learning
and artificial intelligence tasks. However, recent studies have
highlighted that well-trained DNNs, albeit achieving superior
prediction accuracy on natural examples, are in fact quite
vulnerable to adversarial examples. For example, carefully
designed adversarial perturbations to natural images can cause
state-of-the-art image classifiers trained by DNNs to mis-
classify, while the adversarial perturbations can be made
visually imperceptible [1], [2]. Even worse, in addition to
digital spaces, adversarial examples can also be crafted in
physical world by means of realizing adversarial perturbations.
[3]–[5]. Due to the existence and the ease of generating
adversarial examples from DNNs, the inconsistent decision
making between DNN-based machine learning models and
human perception as well as its robustness implications to
safety-critical applications have given rise to the emerging
research field intersecting deep learning and security.
In the context of adversarial examples in DNNs, attacks
refer to means of crafting visually indistinguishable adversarial
perturbations to natural examples, whereas defenses refer
to methods of mitigating adversarial perturbations towards
building a robust DNN model. For the task of image classifi-
cation, targeted attacks aim to craft adversarial perturbations
to render the prediction of the target DNN model towards a
specific label, while untargeted attacks aim to find adversarial
perturbations that will lead the target DNN model to a different
prediction. Perhaps surprisingly, the adversarial perturbations
can be crafted even when the model details of the target DNN
are totally unknown to an attacker, known as the (restricted)
black-box attack setting [6], [7].
An important and perhaps surprising property of adversarial
examples in DNNs is their attack transferability - adversarial
examples generated from one DNN can also successfully fool
another DNN, which we call transfer attacks [1], [8], [9].
Transfer attacks are widely used for evaluating the perfor-
mance of attacks and defenses against adversarial examples in
the black-box setting. In the defender’s perspective, the (obliv-
ious) transfer attacks from an undefended DNN to a defended
DNN of the same model serve as the baseline evaluation of
the deployed defense techniques. In the attacker’s foothold,
executing a transfer attack is a preferable and practical option,
as one can easily craft transferable adversarial examples from
a DNN at hand to attack the target DNN without any prior
knowledge of the target model. Although various defense and
adversarial subspace analysis methods have been proposed to
defend transfer attacks, they have been continuously broken
or bypassed by the subsequent attacks (but possibly with
increased attack strengths) [10]–[15].
Notably, the attack framework established by Carlini and
Wagner in [10], which we call C&W attack for short, is a
powerful attack that is capable of crafting highly transferable
adversarial examples by tuning the confidence parameter.
However, in the oblivious attack setting a recent defense
method called MagNet [16], proposed by Meng and Chen,
has demonstrated robust defense performance against C&W
transfer attack under different confidence levels. In addition,
MagNet can also defend other attacking methods including
the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [2], iterative FGSM
[18], and DeepFool [19]. The success of MagNet in defending
adversarial examples roots in its two complementary defense
modules: (i) a detector that compares the statistical difference
between an input image and the training data; and (ii) a
reformer trained by an auto-encoder that regulates an input
image to the data manifold of training examples. Generally
speaking, the detector module declares an input image as an
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(a) MNIST
(b) CIFAR-10
Fig. 1: Visual illustration of transferable adversarial examples crafted by different attack methods from undefended DNNs to
MagNet in the oblivious (black-box) attack setting [16]. Unsuccessful attacks are marked by red cross sign. EAD [17] can
yield highly transferable and visually similar adversarial examples, whereas C&W attack [10] fails to bypass MagNet.
adversarial example if its statistical distribution is significantly
different from the training data. Otherwise, the input image
further undergoes the reformer module, and the DNN will use
the reformed example for label prediction. We defer the details
of MagNet to Section II-A.
In this paper, we demonstrate the limitation of MagNet
on defending against the adversarial examples generated by
the elastic-net attacks to DNNs (EAD) [17] in the oblivious
attack setting. The major difference of C&W attack and EAD
is the distortion metric when crafting adversarial examples.
C&W attack is a pure L2 distortion based method, whereas
EAD is a hybrid attack using both L1 and L2 distortion
metrics. As will be explained in Section II-B, the use of L1
distortion metric is able to filter out unnecessary perturbations
to insignificant pixels and hence yielding adversarial examples
with better attack performance. Specifically, our experimental
results show that when using using EAD to attack MagNet
with the default defense setting, about 90% of adversarial
examples on MNIST and 80% of those on CIFAR-10 can
successfully bypass MagNet, whereas only 10% and 52%
of the adversarial examples from C&W attack can bypass
the same defense, respectively. For visual illustration, Figure
1 shows some adversarial examples that successfully bypass
MagNet using EAD. These adversarial examples are still visu-
ally similar to the natural examples but will cause the DNN to
misclassify. Furthermore, to corroborate that MagNet is indeed
not robust to L1 distortion based adversarial examples, we
also conduct extensive experiments to evaluate the defense
performance of MagNet under different settings, including
tweaking the parameters of the detector module and changing
the form of the reconstruction error when training the reformer.
It is also worth mentioning that this paper is the first work
to identify the lack of robustness of MagNet to adversarial
examples in the oblivious (black-box) attack setting [16],
where the attacker is completely unaware of the deployed
defense mechanisms. In contrast, the recent work in [20] also
claims to break MagNet by using a much stronger threat
model: the gray-box setting where the attacker knows the
deployed defense technique but not the exact parameters.
Specifically, in order to craft transferable adversarial examples,
Carlini and Wagner modified their attack by leveraging the
knowledge that auto-encoder is the primary defense technique
used in MagNet [20]. Nonetheless, in the oblivious attack
setting MagNet is still effective in defending the original C&W
attack in [10]. Consequently, our results substantially weaken
the assumption of the threat model required to bypass MagNet.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. MagNet: Defending Adversarial Examples using Reformer
and Detector [16]
The essential component used in both the detector and the
reformer of MagNet is the auto-encoder, denoted by AE(x).
The auto-encoder AE(x) takes an image x ∈ Rp as an
input, compresses its information to a lower dimension, and
then reconstructs the image x back to the original dimension.
The default MagNet setting learns a AE by minimizing the
mean squared error ‖x−AE(x)‖22 averaged over all training
examples. For an input image x, let F (x) ∈ [0, 1]K denote
a DNN image classifier of K classes, which outputs a K-
dimensional probability distribution of class predictions. The
defense of MagNet is a serial two-stage process. First, MagNet
computes the Jensen-Shannon divergence (JSD) between F (x)
and F (AE(x)) with a temperature parameter T , denoted
by JSD(F (x)/T ), F (AE(x)/T ). The input x is deemed
adversarial if its JSD is greater than a certain threshold.
Similarly, the reconstruction loss ‖x − AE(x)‖ can also be
used as a detector. Otherwise, x then undergoes the reformer
AE(x) before passing down to the DNN for classification. The
reformer is responsible for projecting the input example to the
data manifold learned by the auto-encoder such that the DNN
is expected to yield correct label prediction after reforming the
input example. Overall, MagNet uses the detector to filter out
adversarial examples with statistically significant perturbations
and relies on the reformer to rectify the adversarial examples
with small perturbations (those that are not rejected by the
detector) towards correct class prediction. In Section III we
will evaluate the defense performance of the default MagNet
setting and its robust variants.
B. EAD: Elastic-Net Attacks to DNNs [17]
Let (x0, t0) denote a natural example with a associated
class label t0 and let (x, t) denote its adversarial example
with a target attack label t 6= t0. The Lq norm of the image
difference δ = x − x0, defined as ‖δ‖q = (
∑p
i=1 |δi|q)1/q
when q ≥ 1, is a widely used distortion metric between
natural and adversarial examples. For targeted attacks, EAD
finds an effective adversarial example by solving the following
optimization problem:
minimizex c · f(x, t) + ‖x− x0‖22 + β‖x− x0‖1
subject to x ∈ [0, 1]p, (1)
where the box constraint x ∈ [0, 1]p ensures every pixel value
of x lies within a valid normalized image space, c, β ≥ 0 are
regularization parameters for f and L1 distortion, respectively,
and f(x, t) is the attack loss function defined as
f(x, t) = max{max
j 6=t
[Logit(x)]j − [Logit(x)]t,−κ}, (2)
where Logit(x) = [[Logit(x)]1, . . . , [Logit(x)]K ] ∈ RK is the
logit of x (the internal layer representation prior to the softmax
layer) in the considered DNN, also known as the unnormalized
probabilities. The parameter κ ≥ 0 is called the confidence
that accounts for attack transferability. The hinge-like loss
in (2) implies that the attack loss f is minimized when its
unnormalized probability of being the target class t is κ lager
that that of being the next possible class prediction. Similarly,
for untargeted attacks, EAD uses the following attack loss
function (dropping the notation t):
f(x) = max{[Logit(x)]t0 −max
j 6=t
[Logit(x)]j ,−κ}. (3)
Notable, C&W attack [10] is a special case of EAD when
β = 0, resulting in a pure L2 distortion based attack. We
argue that considering the L1 distortion (i.e., set β > 0) is
TABLE I: Comparison of different attacks on MagNet (default
setting) with different confidence κ on MNIST and CIFAR-10.
ASR means attack success rate (%). The distortion metrics are
averaged over successful examples. EAD yields high ASR.
MNIST CIFAR-10
Attack method β κ ASR L1 L2 κ ASR L1 L2
C&W (L2) NA 15 10 (best) 3.553 1.477 20 52 3.675 0.126
EAD
(EN rule)
10−3 20 46.2 3.116 2.165 15 69.2 3.024 0.242
10−2 15 87.8 0.531 2.509 15 74.5 2.73 0.380
5 · 10−2 15 90.1 0.266 2.730 15 77 2.810 0.544
10−1 15 90.2 0.433 2.803 15 78.6 3.234 0.681
EAD
(L1 rule)
10−3 20 70.2 1.89 2.507 15 60.5 1.1718 0.327
10−2 15 84.5 0.449 2.701 15 66.7 1.646 0.495
5 · 10−2 15 80.5 0.351 2.876 15 75.9 2.258 0.678
10−1 15 83.8 0.381 2.922 15 79.8 2.883 0.805
crucial in crafting transferable adversarial examples, which
can be explained by the fact that β plays the role of nulling
unnecessary perturbations to insignificant pixels and shrinking
the perturbation to important pixels, as indicated by C&W
attack. Specifically, let g(x) = c · f(x, t) + ‖x− x0‖22 be the
C&W attack objective function from (1) by setting β = 0.
When solving (1) via projected gradient descent, EAD uses
the iterative shrinkage-thresholding algorithm (ISTA) [21]:
x(k+1) = Sβ(x
(k) − αk∇g(x(k))), (4)
where x(k) is the k-th iterate with x(0) = x0, ∇g(x(k))
denotes the gradient of g at x(k), αk denotes the step size,
and Sβ : Rp 7→ Rp is an pixel-wise projected shrinkage-
thresholding function defined as
[Sβ(z)]i =
 min{zi − β, 1}, if zi − x0i > β;x0i, if |zi − x0i| ≤ β;
max{zi + β, 0}, if zi − x0i < −β,
(5)
for any i ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Therefore, with the use of ISTA, at
each iteration EAD retains the original pixel value [x0]i if the
level of perturbation, indicated by |[x(k)−x0−αk∇g(x(k))]i|,
is no greater than β. Otherwise, it shrinks the level of pertur-
bation by β and projects the resulting pixel value to the box
[0, 1] if |[x(k) − x0 − αk∇g(x(k))]i| > β. Furthermore, since
g is the attack objective function of C&W attack, EAD can
be interpreted as a sparsity-induced C&W attack, where the
ISTA step at each iteration adds zero perturbation to the i-th
pixel if its C&W attack gradient [∇g]i is small (i.e., the pixel
is deemed insignificant for attack), or reduces the perturbation
by β if [∇g]i is large, leading to sharp adversarial examples
with better attack performance.
III. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we demonstrate EAD can bypass MagNet
on two popular image classification datasets - MNIST and
CIFAR-10. MNIST is a popular handwritten digit dataset.
Each image in the dataset represents a number from 0 to
9. For CIFAR-10, there are 10 image categories: airplanes,
cars, birds, cats, deer, dogs, frogs, boats, trucks. The visual
illustrations of adversarial examples crafted by different attack
methods on the default MagNet are displayed in Figure 1.
A. Experiment Setup, Parameter Setting and Threat Model
We follow the oblivious attack setting used in MagNet [16]
to implement untargeted attacks from an undefended DNN to
the same DNN protected by MagNet, where the attacker is
unaware of MagNet’s existence. The same DNN architecture
and training parameters in [16] are used to train the image
classifiers on MNIST and CIFAR-10. The defense perfor-
mance against adversarial examples (which we call classifi-
cation accuracy) of MagNet is measured by the percentage of
adversarial examples that are either detected by the MagNet’s
detector, or correctly classified by the DNN after reforming,
which complements the attack success rate (ASR). That is,
higher ASR implies weaker defense. We focus on the com-
parison between C&W attack1 (L2 based attack) and EAD2
(L1 based attack) when evaluating the defense capability of
MagNet. The best regularization parameter c is obtained via 9
binary search steps (starting from 0.001) and 1000 iterations
are used for each attack with the same initial learning rate
0.01. For EAD, we report the attack results using different L1
regularization parameter β and decision rules (elastic-net (EN)
or L1 distortion) for selecting the final adversarial example.
On MNIST and CIFAR-10, we craft adversarial examples with
different confidence level κ picked in the range of [0, 40]
and [0,100] with an increment of 5, respectively. The default
MagNet setting3 and our implemented robust variants are used
for defense evaluation. On both MNIST and CIFAR-10, we
randomly selected 1000 correctly classified images from the
test sets to attack MagNet. All experiments are conducted
using an Intel Xeon E5-2620v4 CPU, 125 GB RAM and a
NVIDIA TITAN Xp GPU with 12 GB RAM.
Note that although Meng et al. provide their training pa-
rameters and DNN model used in their best experimental
results, we cannot reproduce such effectively defensive results
displayed in the MagNet paper [16]. All the reported results
in this paper correspond to our self-trained MagNet.
B. Performance Evaluation of Oblivious Attacks on MagNet
When crafting adversarial examples, the attack strength can
be adjusted by changing the confidence level κ. The higher
the confidence, the stronger the attack strength, but also the
greater the distortion. Table I summarizes the statistics of ad-
versarial examples crafted by different attacks under different
confidence κ on MNIST and CIFAR-10 against the default
MagNet. It is apparent that considering L1 distortion when
crafting adversarial examples indeed greatly improves attack
performance when compared to merely using L2 distortion, as
discussed in Section II-B.
In addition to showing the attack results under the default
MagNet setting, we also adjusted the defense parameters used
in MagNet to make it more robust, which we call robust
MagNet. However, we find that even MagNet’s defensive
capability can be improved, EAD can still effectively attack
1https://github.com/carlini/nn robust attacks.
2https://github.com/ysharma1126/EAD-Attack
3https://github.com/Trevillie/MagNet
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Fig. 2: Defense performance of default and robust MagNets
against C&W and EAD attacks on MNIST. Higher accuracy
means better defense. Different from C&W attack, EAD
significantly degrades MagNet’s defense performance.
robust MagNet. In what follows, Section III-B1 and Section
III-B3 discuss the experimental results of EAD attacking
MagNet, and Section III-B2 and Section III-B4 discuss the
experimental results of EAD attacking robust MagNet.
1) MagNet with default setting on MNIST: Because MNIST
is a simple image classification task, Meng et al. [16] use only
two detectors based on L1 and L2 reconstruction errors. Figure
2 (a) shows the defense performance of the default MagNet. It
is observed that the detector rejects more adversarial examples
and hence becomes more effective as the confidence increases,
which can be explained by the fact that the detector is designed
to filter out the input example when it is too far away from
the data manifold of natural training examples. On the other
hand, when the input example is close to the data manifold,
the reformer is in charge of rectifying the input via the trained
auto-encoder. The detector and reformer hence compliment
each other and constitute MagNet. Interestingly, there is a dip
when the confidence levels are between 10 and 20 because in
this range, the effectiveness of the reformer is diminishing and
the detectors are yet ineffective.
Remarkably, the classification accuracy of C&W attack is
above 90% at all confidence levels, meaning that C&W attack
to MagNet is not effective in the oblivious attack setting.
Indeed, in [20] Carlini and Wagner impose a much stronger
threat model assumption than the oblivious attack setting in
order to bypass the default MagNet, which requires knowing
the existence of auto-encoder as a defense module. On the
other hand, we find that in the oblivious attack setting, the
default MagNet fails to defend a majority of adversarial
examples crafted by EAD. For instance, comparing C&W
attack with EAD when setting β = 10−1 at the confidence
15, MagNet’s classification accuracy reduces significantly
from 90% to 9.7%, suggesting that approximately 90% of
adversarial examples crafted by EAD with confidence 15
can bypass MagNet. Comparing to [20], this result suggests
TABLE II: Defensive architecture of robust MagNet on
MNIST, including both encoders and decoders.
Detector I & Reformer Detector II
Conv.Sigmoid 3× 3× 256 Conv.Sigmoid 3× 3× 256
AveragePooling 2× 2 Conv.Sigmoid 3× 3× 256
Conv.Sigmoid 3× 3× 256 Conv.Sigmoid 3× 3× 1
Conv.Sigmoid 3× 3× 256
Upsampling 2× 2
Conv.Sigmoid 3× 3× 256
Conv.Sigmoid 3× 3× 1
TABLE III: MNIST test accuracy (%).
Default (D) D+JSD D+256 D+256+JSD
Without
MagNet
99.42 99.42 99.42 99.42
With
MagNet
99.13 97.75 99.24 97.55
that a weaker threat model that is completely unaware of
MagNet defense is sufficient for successful adversarial attacks
on MNIST. It it also worth noting that since C&W attack only
uses L2 distortion while EAD uses both L1 and L2 distortion,
the significant difference in defense performance degradation
corroborates the effect of involving the L1 distortion when
crafting effective adversarial examples.
We also investigate the effects of the L1 regularization
parameter β and decision rules in EAD on attacking the default
MagNet. Due to space limitations, we summarize our findings
below and display the visual diagrams in the supplementary
material. When β is small (e.g., β = 10−3), we obtain a better
attack performance under the L1 decision rule than that under
the EN rule because in this case L2 distortion dominates the
EN distortion. As β becomes larger, the attack performance of
EAD under the EN rule is better than that under the L1 rule,
which can be explained by the potential over-contraction and
aggressive thresholding for large β in the ISTA step of EAD.
2) EAD attack on robust MagNet on MNIST: The default
setting of MagNet on MNIST contains only two detectors
based on L1 and L2 reconstruction errors, respectively. We
added two JSD detectors with temperature T of 10 and 40 to
MagNet. In Figure 2 (b), this MagNet can achieve above 96%
classification accuracy on adversarial examples generated by
C&W L2 attack at all tested confidence levels. Comparing to
Figure 2 (a), the defense performance is indeed improved by
including JSD detectors. However, it is still not robust to EAD,
since approximately 40 % of adversarial examples crafted by
EAD can still bypass this MagNet.
We also changed the number of filters used in a auto-
encoder’s convolution layer from 3 to 256 (see Table II).
We find that auto-encoders can be more stable and achieve
better performance on encoding and decoding by increasing
the number of filters within a reasonable range, and this factor
actually improves the robustness of MagNet. As shown in
Figure 2 (c), this change indeed leads to better defense against
C&W attack, particularly in the confidence level ranging from
5 to 25. However, approximately 70 % of adversarial examples
crafted by EAD can still bypass this robust MagNet.
Figure 2 (d) shows that MagNet can further improves its
defense performance by jointly changing the number of filter
TABLE IV: Best attack success rate (ASR) (%) of EAD on
MNIST. Higher ASR means weaker defense.
Decision rule β Default (D) D+JSD D+256 D+256+JSD
EAD
(EN rule)
10−3 46.2 7.5 31.2 1.9
10−2 87.8 34 90.1 39.5
5 · 10−2 90.1 51.6 93.6 60
10−1 90.2 55.6 94.3 65.1
EAD
(L1 rule)
10−3 70.2 18.9 72.9 14.1
10−2 84.5 38.8 92.6 49.5
5 · 10−2 80.5 48.8 90.3 62.6
10−1 83.8 51 92.1 66.3
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Fig. 3: Defense performance of default and robust MagNets
against C&W and EAD attacks on CIFAR-10. Higher accuracy
means better defense. Different from C&W attack, EAD
significantly degrades MagNet’s defense performance.
to 256 and adding the two JSD detectors. Nonetheless, it still
fails to defense against approximately 50 % of adversarial
examples crafted by EAD, suggesting limited robustness in
MagNet against L1 distortion based adversarial examples.
To justify the vulnerability of MagNet to L1 distortion based
adversarial examples is not caused by the use of L2 reconstruc-
tion error when training the auto-encoders in MagNet, we also
trained auto-encoders using the mean absolute error (L1 loss)
on MNIST. We find that these auto-encoders used in MagNet
can defend C&W L2 attacks but are still susceptible to EAD.
The visual diagrams are given in the supplementary material.
Given different MagNet models on MNIST, Table II and
Table III summarize the prediction accuracy on the test dataset
and the best ASR of adversarial examples among the tested
confidence levels, respectively. We conclude that the default
and robust MagNet are able to defeat L2 attacks, while they
are still vulnerable to L1 attacks using EAD.
3) Default MagNet on CIFAR-10: Training and securing
a classifier on CIFAR-10 is more challenging than that on
MNIST. In Magnet, Meng et al. use two types of detectors
based on L1 and L2 reconstruction errors as well as two JSD
detectors with the temperature T of 10 and 40. Specifically, the
JSD detectors are shown to be effective in detecting adversarial
examples with large reconstruction errors.
We adjusted the strength of attack by changing the con-
fidence in the range from 0 to 100 and show the defense
performance in Figure 3 (a). Using the default MagNet, ap-
proximately 70% of the adversarial examples crafted by EAD
will not be detected or corrected by MagNet at confidence
10. Moreover, despite using effective detectors on CIFAR-10,
MagNet’s classification accuracy is particularly vulnerable to
EAD at the confidence levels ranging from 10 to 20.
TABLE V: Defensive architecture of robust MagNet on
CIFAR-10, including both encoders and decoders.
Detectors & Reformer
Conv.Sigmoid 3× 3× 256
Conv.Sigmoid 3× 3× 256
Conv.Sigmoid 3× 3× 3
TABLE VI: CIFAR-10 test accuracy (%).
Default (D) D + 256
Without
MagNet
86.91 86.91
With
MagNet
83.33 83.4
4) EAD attack on robust MagNet on CIFAR-10: We
changed the number of filters used in a auto-encoder’s con-
volution layer from 3 to 256 (see Table V) and summarize
the resulting CIFAR-10 test accuracy in Table VI. Comparing
Figure 3 (a) and Figure 3 (b), this robust MagNet aids in more
effective defense against C&W L2 attack at all confidence
levels than the default MagNet on CIFAR-10. However, we
find that EAD can still attain high attack success rate as β
increases in both defense settings, as summarized in Table VII,
which suggests limited defense capability of MagNet against
L1 distortion based adversarial examples on CIFAR-10.
We also investigated the defense performance of MagNet
with different reconstruction errors for training the auto-
encoders on the CIFAR-10 training set. Similar to MNIST,
we find that on CIFAR-10, replacing the mean squared error
with the mean absolute error can defend C&W L2 attacks but
not the L1 based attacks using EAD. The visual diagrams are
given in the supplementary material.
IV. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
We summarize the main results of this paper as follows:
• On MNIST, the default MagNet using the detectors
merely based on reconstruction errors is not robust.
• The setting of auto-encoders has a great influence on
MagNet’s defensive ability.
• Despite its success in defending L2 distortion based
adversarial examples on MNIST and CIFAR-10, MagNet
and its robust variants are ineffective against L1 distortion
based adversarial examples crafted by EAD. Furthermore,
even though we implemented improved detectors in Mag-
Net, EAD can still easily craft adversarial examples that
bypass MagNet in the oblivious attack setting, which
substantially weakens the existing attack assumption of
knowing the deployed defense technique when attacking
MagNet in the existing literature.
Based on our analysis, we have the following suggestions
for evaluating and designing future defense models:
• L1 and L2 based adversarial examples have distinct
characteristics. Future defense models should test their
robustness against both cases.
• In the oblivious attack setting, neither the reformer nor
the detector in MagNet can effectively defend against
adversarial examples at the medium confidence levels,
which calls for additional defense mechanisms.
TABLE VII: Best attack success rate (ASR) (%) of EAD on
CIFAR-10. Higher ASR means weaker defense.
Decision rule β Default (D) D+256
EAD
(EN rule)
10−3 69.2 55.6
10−2 74.5 72
5 · 10−2 77 86.3
10−1 78.6 91.5
EAD
(L1 rule)
10−3 60.5 49.2
10−2 66.7 71.8
5 · 10−2 75.9 90.9
10−1 79.8 93.7
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL: COMPLETE DEFENSE
PERFORMANCE PLOTS OF MAGNET
Here we plot the defense performance of different variants
of MagNet on MNIST and CIFAR-10. For each variant we
also show four defense schemes: (1) no defense - plain DNN;
(2) DNN with only MagNet detector(s); (3) DNN with only
MagNet reformer; and (4) DNN with detector(s) and reformer.
All experiments are performed in the oblivious attack setting.
• Figure 4 shows the defense performance of 4 different
variants of MagNet against C&W attack on MNIST.
• Figure 5 shows the defense performance of 2 different
variants of MagNet against C&W attack on CIFAR-10.
• Figure 6 shows the defense performance of the default
MagNet against EAD attacks with different values of the
L1 regularization parameter β and different decision rules
on MNIST.
• Figure 7 shows the defense performance of the default
MagNet against EAD attacks with different values of the
L1 regularization parameter β and different decision rules
on CIFAR-10.
• Figure 8 shows the defense performance of the robust
MagNet (by including 2 additional JSD detectors) against
EAD attacks with different values of the L1 regularization
parameter β and different decision rules on MNIST.
• Figure 9 shows the defense performance of the robust
MagNet (by increasing the number of filters to be 256)
against EAD attacks with different values of the L1
regularization parameter β and different decision rules
on MNIST.
• Figure 10 shows the defense performance of the robust
MagNet (by increasing the number of filters to be 256
and including 2 additional JSD detectors ) against EAD
attacks with different values of the L1 regularization
parameter β and different decision rules on MNIST.
• Figure 11 shows the defense performance of the robust
MagNet (by increasing the number of filters to be 256)
against EAD attacks with different values of the L1
regularization parameter β and different decision rules
on CIFAR-10.
• Figure 12 shows the defense performance of the default
MagNet using either L1 (mean absolute error) or L2
(mean squared error) reconstruction loss when training
the auto-encoder on MNIST.
• Figure 13 shows the defense performance of the default
MagNet using either L1 (mean absolute error) or L2
(mean squared error) reconstruction loss when training
the auto-encoder on CIFAR-10.
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Fig. 4: C&W L2 attack to MagNet under different auto-encoder structure on MNIST dataset with varying confidence.
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Fig. 5: C&W L2 attack to MagNet under different auto-encoder structure on CIFAR-10 dataset with varying confidence.
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(a) L1 decision rule β = 10−3
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Fig. 6: EAD attacks on default MagNet under different β and different decision rules on MNIST with varying confidence.
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Fig. 7: EAD attacks on default MagNet under different β and different decision rules on CIFAR-10 with varying confidence.
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Fig. 8: EAD attacks on robust MagNet under different β and different decision rules on MNIST with varying confidence. Two
JSD detectors are added into MagNet.
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Fig. 9: EAD attacks on robust MagNet under different β and different decision rules on MNIST dataset with varying confidence.
The number of filters in a auto-encoder’s convolution layer is increased to 256.
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Fig. 10: EAD attacks on robust MagNet under different β and different decision rules on MNIST with varying confidence.
The number of filters in a auto-encoder’s convolution layer is increased to 256 and two JSD detectors are added into MagNet.
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Fig. 11: EAD attacks on robust MagNet under different β and different decision rules on CIFAR-10 with varying confidence.
The number of filters in a auto-encoder’s convolution layer is increased to 256.
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Fig. 12: Defense comparison when training the auto-encoders with different loss functions on MNIST using default MagNet.
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Fig. 13: Defense comparison when training the auto-encoders with different loss functions on CIFAR-10 using default MagNet.
